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Abstract
We test how donors respond to new information about a charity’s effectiveness. Freedom
from Hunger implemented a test of its direct marketing solicitations, varying letters by
whether they include a discussion of their program’s impact as measured by scientific
research. The base script, used for both treatment and control, included a standard
qualitative story about an individual beneficiary. Adding scientific impact information
has no effect on average likelihood of giving or average gift amount. However, we find
important heterogeneity: large prior donors both are more likely to give and also give
more, whereas small prior donors are less likely to give. This pattern is consistent with
two different types of donors: warm glow donors who respond negatively to analytical
effectiveness information, and altruism donors who respond positively to such
information.
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1. Introduction
Understanding why people choose to donate to charity is difficult; people give for
different and multiple reasons. However, if asked, donors typically like the idea of giving
to effective charities. Are such statements cheap talk, or are donors’ behaviors consistent
with this stated preference? Organizations that believe donors will not respond favorably
may underinvestment in impact assessment (Pritchett 2002). Here we put forward
evidence, albeit on a small scale, that some donors respond favorably to evidence from
randomized trials whereas others respond negatively. This behavior is consistent with
large and small donors giving for different reasons.
We collaborated with Freedom from Hunger (FFH) to conduct two waves of
direct-mail marketing to prior donors. FFH is a US-based nonprofit organization that
provides technical advisory services to microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing
countries. In the first wave, the control group received an emotional appeal focused on a
specific beneficiary, along with a narrative explaining how FFH ultimately helped the
individual. The treatment group received a similar emotional appeal (trimmed by one
paragraph), with an added paragraph about scientific research on FFH’s impact. The
second wave was similar in design, except that the treatment group narrative included
more details on the research, including a brief discussion about the benefits of
randomized trials.
We find that average donation behavior does not change when previous donors
are presented with evidence of the charity’s effectiveness in achieving its goals.
However, we find that the aggregate effect masks different responses by small and large
prior donors: larger prior donors, as measured by the amount given in the last donation
before the experiment, donate more and small prior donors donate less in response to
being told about the scientifically-measured effectiveness of the charity.
The positive response of large donors is consistent with altruism aimed at
effectively supporting the goals of FFH, but the small donor response is more puzzling. It
has long been recognized that altruism cannot be the entire explanation for charitable
giving, though, as it would lead to complete crowd-out of donations in response to other
funding sources, which is not borne out by most estimates of crowd-out (Andreoni 2006).
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Many researchers have suggested other motives less tied to public good production, such
as the warm glow of giving (Andreoni 1990).
Recent experiments provide more direct evidence on the warm-glow motives that
are part of our model below. Null (2011) looks at how members of service clubs divided
$100 among three charities. Most participants in Null (2011) reveal warm glow motives
by giving to multiple charities, which is incompatible with risk-neutral altruism (risk
neutral altruists would give the entire $100 to the charity with the highest expected
impact). In another direct test of warm-glow preferences, Crumpler and Grossman (2008)
observes that most subjects gave to a charity even though their donation crowded-out
one-for-one a donation by the experimenters.
Some prior research also finds differences in charitable giving between small and
large donors. Using a panel data set on charitable donations, Reinstein (2011) finds that
larger donors have more “expenditure substitution” in charitable giving. He finds that a
temporary shock such as a personal appeal that increases donations to one charity
decreases donations to other charities for large donors but has little effect on other
donation decisions by small donors. Reinstein suggests that small donors are responding
primarily to temporary shocks or personal appeals, while large donors have other
motives.
DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) also provides evidence, from a field
experiment, that small donors have different motivations than large donors, in this case
focusing on social pressure. Individual donations were observed during a door-to-door
fund-raising campaign. One-third of addresses were simply visited by fund-raisers, while
another third were informed the day before the visit that the visit would occur, and a final
third were informed and given a check-box form that they could use to opt out of the
visit. Allowing subjects to avoid the fundraisers reduced the share of subjects answering
the door and also reduced giving by small donors, but not larger donations. Their
interpretation is that small donors in this context are primarily motivated by social
pressure or avoidance of an annoyance. Although we examine the distinction as well
between small and large donors as well, there are two notable differences in our setting:
first, our respondents had previously given to the charity, thus expressed some preference
for supporting them and less likely to give merely out of social pressure; second, as a
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direct mail experiment there was no human interaction, thus we argue that the likelihood
of giving out of social pressure is quite low in our experiment.
Of course, warm glow motives are not the only non-altruistic motivate for giving.
For example, subjects may want to signal a meritorious motive to themselves or others
(Bodner and Prelec 2003; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Karlan and McConnell 2014). While
social signaling seems unlikely to be a major factor in our subjects’ decision-making as
their donations are never observed publically, self-signaling could be a factor in donor
behavior in our context.
Providing further evidence of non-altruistic donor motivations, several laboratory
experiments have found that emotionally triggered generosity may be dampened by
appeals that include statistical or deliberative information. For example, people donate
less to feed a malnourished child when statistics that put this child in the larger context of
famine in Africa are mentioned (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). Similarly, people
expressed diminishing willingness to fund clean water that would suffice to save the lives
of 4500 people in a refugee camp threatened by cholera as the population of the camp
increased (Fethersonhaugh et al. 1997). Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic suggests that
deliberate thinking decreases the emotional appeal of identifiable victims without a
commensurate increase in motivation to give to statistical victims, which causes a drop in
donations. Although relevant for our study, it is important to note a key difference:
neither of these experiments focuses on effectiveness of the charity, but rather each
focuses on the depth of the need, and the number of people in crisis. Our treatment
wording does not suggest mention need at all, but instead effectiveness.2
Our work also builds on a growing and pragmatic literature on how donors
respond to information about charities, such as Yoruk (2013), which studies, with a
regression discontinuity approach, how donors respond to Charity Navigator’s 5 star
rating system. Charity Navigator uses mostly financial and governance data, i.e., not data
of impact of the work of the charity. Yoruk finds that for otherwise similar charities, a
one-star rating increase leads to 19.5 percent higher donations if the charities are

2

In addition our data come from the normal operations of a nonprofit organization, without risk of
individuals behaving differently because they are aware that their responses will influence a research study
(see Levitt and List 2007 for a discussion of these methodological issues).
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relatively unknown, but that the rating increases have no effect on better-known
charities.3
2. Motivation and Model
Following a paradigm put forward by Kahneman (2003) we explore a model of
giving that incorporates two motivations for giving, altruism (akin to Kahneman’s
System II decisions, which are deliberate, effortful, reasoned and focused on impact) and
warm glow (akin to Kahneman’s System I decisions, which are intuitive, effortless and
reactive). The model makes an important prediction: that individuals driven by altruism,
holding all else equal (such as wealth and education), will respond favorably to
information about the effectiveness of a particular charity, whereas those driven by more
emotionally-based triggers may actually reduce giving.
Our model is inspired by research that deliberation can interfere with emotional
impulses for giving (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). Our basic assumption is that
donors get utility from donations through: (1) altruism, in which the donation affects
utility through the increased social welfare generated by the donation, and/or (2) warmglow, in which the act of donating increases utility directly. This model makes the case
that donation size is a proxy (no doubt imperfect, empirically) that allows us to sort by
giving type, and that different giving types respond heterogeneously to analytical aid
effectiveness information.
We adopt an important distinction between altruism and warm-glow, also made
by Null (2011): altruists view charities as perfect substitutes and so respond to
differences in charity efficiency, while warm-glow donors value the act of donating and
are not responsive to efficiency. More generally, some gifts may be more likely given
casually, simply to participate or to appease social pressure (DellaVigna, List, and
Malmendier 2012), without much concern for effectiveness. As long as these motivations
for giving are not responsive to the impact of donations and instead stem from stronger
emotional attachment to the charity, they could yield similar predictions to warm-glow.
We refer to the non-altruistic component of utility as “warm glow” while recognizing that
3

Many leaders in the philanthropic space (including the leaders of Charity Navigator, see
http://www.overheadmyth.com) have criticized the use of overhead and management ratios, but little is
available to donors beyond such data on a comprehensive level (e.g., Givewell.org, an alternative charity
evaluator, focuses strictly on evidence of impact per dollar donated and room for growth, but in each year
has named typically between 3 and 10 charities, in a limited number of causes).
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warm glow refers more particularly to a joy of giving motive. Our data do not allow us to
distinguish sharply between some of these motives, and we will discuss alternative
interpretations following our results.
Our subjects divide their income y into a donation to a charity, g, and
consumption net of giving, c. Utility from charitable giving stems from two sources,
altruism and warm-glow. Utility is quasi-linear with constant marginal utility from
consumption:
!! ! = !!! + ! !! ∗ !(!") ! + ! (1 − !! ) ∗ !! ∗ !(!).!
β parameterizes the importance of altruism relative to warm-glow for a given subject i, γ
parameterizes the charity’s effectiveness (or more precisely, the perception of the
charity’s effectiveness, which we assume to be the same for all i), and ei parameterizes
how emotionally connected the subject is to the charity.
Both the altruism component of utility A and the warm-glow component of utility
W are strictly increasing, strictly concave functions. Warm-glow utility is independent of
the effectiveness of the charity and is instead weighted by emotional attachment, e. The
altruism component is not weighted by e and takes as its argument the increase in social
welfare produced by the subject’s donation. For small gifts, the marginal social benefit of
each unit donated will be approximately constant and γ measures that slope. 4
Let γ0 and e0 be the representative individual’s beliefs about the effectiveness of
FFH and emotional connection to FFH before the experiment and in the control
condition. We think of treatment as providing better evidence about effectiveness
(!! > !! ) but reducing the immediate emotional connection of some subjects to FFH
(!!! ≤ !!" ). We assume that initially, both perfectly altruistic (! = 1) and perfectly
warm-glow donors (! = 0) get enough utility from donating to donate a positive amount.
Letting!!! !! (0) ! > !1, the optimal donation of purely altruistic donors is positive, and
likewise if !! !(0) > 1,!then perfectly warm-glow donors make a positive donation.
We first establish our claim that small and large donations tend to be driven by
different motives (proofs are in the appendix).
4

Strictly speaking, our altruists are closer to the “impact philanthropists” of Duncan (2004).
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Proposition 1: If pure altruists give more than pure warm-glow donors, then the optimal
donation !∗ is strictly increasing in the importance of altruism!!. If pure altruists give
less than pure warm-glow donors, then !∗ is strictly decreasing in !.
Donors with these different motives have empirically distinguishable responses to
treatment. The experimental treatment’s additional information about research is likely to
increase how effective the subject perceives each unit donated to be, to γ1> γ0, but also
for some subjects may reduce the emotional connection the subject feels to the charity, to
ei1<ei0. The latter change means that subjects for whom emotional connection is
especially important will possibly not donate or will decrease their donations.
Proposition 2. For sufficiently warm-glow subjects, if treatment reduces their emotional
connection enough, they respond by not donating. Furthermore treatment never causes
sufficiently warm-glow individuals to increase their donation.
The response of altruistic subjects is more ambiguous. Intuitively, an increase in γ
is effectively a decrease in the price of social welfare, and it will have both income and
substitution effects. If the substitution effect is strong enough, high ! subjects will
increase their donations:
Proposition 3. Donors only respond to an increase in the evidence of effectiveness γ by
increasing their donations if altruism has a large enough substitution effect (−!!! (!)/
! (!) ! < !1 for all x). The response is increasing in the donor’s relative degree of
altruism !..
Given the quasi-linear utility form we assume, the subjects predicted to respond most
positively to the experimental treatment are relatively altruistic individuals for which the
substitution effect is strong; their response is on the intensive margin. Relatively warmglow subjects respond less strongly or respond negatively on the extensive margin.
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3. Experimental Design
The two experimental waves were conducted in June 2007 and October 2008.5 All waves
were conducted as part of regularly scheduled direct-mail fundraising campaigns, and all
subjects were recent donors, defined as those who had given at least once to FFH in
either the year of the experiment or the previous three calendar years. The designs of the
mailers sent in each wave were similar but not identical. In accordance with FFH’s
policy, two types of letters were sent: first class in closed envelopes for donors that had
donated more than $100 previously, or non-profit mailing in window envelopes for
donors that had previously donated less than $100.
In the first wave, June 2007, mailers were sent to 16,889 individuals who donated
to FFH at least once between 2004 and 2007. Subjects were randomly assigned to receive
one of three different types of solicitation, with the randomization stratified based on
most recent donation year and previous donation amount above or below $100. About
two-thirds (11,258) of the sample was assigned to control which contained a standard
emotional and personal story about a program participant in Bolivia.6 The treatment
group (5,631) received an identical insert with the exception of the final paragraph, which
instead mentioned studies that used “rigorous scientific methodologies” (the exact script
is in the appendix) demonstrating the positive impact of the particular FFH program.
In the second wave, October 2008, mailers were sent to 17,784 individuals who
donated to FFH at least once between 2005 and 2008. Randomization was stratified on
size of most recent donation (above/below $100), experimental status in the June 2007
round, and whether or not the donor had donated in 2008. Again, all individuals were
mailed a renewal letter requesting donations and providing an update on one of FFH’s
regional programs. Of the sample, 5,960 were in the control group and received a renewal
5

An initial second wave was attempted in March 2008 but an error in the randomization led us to drop
these results from the analysis. We discovered upon receipt of the data that the March 2008 wave was not
randomized, but rather the timing of prior giving determined which letter was received. We considered
using a regression discontinuity approach, but were deterred by imprecision of the discontinuity that we
were not able to unravel, as well as the irony of using non-experimental analysis (for something that could
be easily randomized) to identify the impact of using experimental impact evaluations to guide donor
decisions.
6
The control group had two sub-groups, one that received an insert and another that did not. Both
contained the same basic narrative and marketing approach. All regressions include a control for the impact
of an insert, as measured through this second control group. The test of the presence of an insert was not
germane to the research, but rather was part of Freedom from Hunger’s own ongoing testing of its mailers.
Thus we control for it, but do not include it as part of our reported analysis.
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letter with an emotional appeal to an identifiable victim. A further 5,903 received an
identical renewal letter, except that there were additional paragraphs detailing the
effectiveness of FFH programs in helping people like the previously introduced victim.
The final 5,921 received the same letter as the other 5,903 in the treatment group, except
that their letters explicitly cited Yale-affiliated researchers as the source of the statistics
on the program’s effectiveness. The probability of assignment to treatment was adjusted
to maximize power, conditional on the stratification variables, as per the procedures
details in Hahn, Hirano and Karlan (2011).
There is overlap across the two waves, however our analysis pools the two
irrespective of what individuals received in the prior mailer (and lack of power precludes
our ability to build and test theories on how the two waves may interact with each other).
Thus the pooled sample consists of 34,673 mailers to 21,643 prior donors. Of these,
13,030 prior donors were included in both June 2007 and October 2008 wave; 3,859 in
the June 2007 wave only; and 4,754 in the October 2008 wave only. For the 21,643 in
both waves, given the time gap in between the waves, each individual wave is treated as
one observation.
Table 1 reports basic summary statistics, both pre-experimental and experimental.
We also test for orthogonality across treatment assignments, and find no statistically
significant differences.
4. Experimental Results
Table 1 provides an overview of OLS regressions with the pooled results for two
outcomes: making any donation (within five months of the mailer), and donation amount
(including non-response as zero, and again limiting to the five months following the
mailer). All regressions controlled for the wave of data and whether the individual
received the special mailing package (i.e., the stratification variable).
Because there are outliers in the dependent variable, we use four methods to
examine robustness to different functional forms: simple amount donated, amount
donated winsorized at $1000 (which constitutes the 99.8th percentile), and the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the amount donated (because log of amount donated would drop those
who did not donate).

9

Columns 1-4 present the main results for the full sample, and we find no
statistically significant effects from the treatment on either likelihood of giving or amount
given.
We then present the heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to log of prior
gift in Columns 5-8. On both the likelihood of giving (Column 5) and amount given
(Columns 6-8) we observe important heterogeneity, with a negative and statistically
significant coefficient on the base treatment effect (thus negative treatment effect for the
smallest prior donors) and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term of
treatment and log of prior gift. The estimates are both such that they are close to zero for
the average prior donor (which is consistent with Columns 1-4, in which no statistically
significant results are found for the full sample).
Figures 1 and 2 show a similar pattern, with bar charts for the treatment effects for
each quartile of prior gift amount; however, when examined quartile by quartile, no
individual result is statistically significant.
Importantly, we examine the heterogeneous treatment effect after including
controls for heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to income, education and the
special prior mailer. Although we do not have individual-level data on income and
education, we do have census data matched on zip-code. These are included in Columns
5-8.
Lastly, we also note that we observe many tiny donations in our data (the 10th
percentile prior gift is $10, and 2.8% of prior donors gave exactly $1). This is normal in
retail fundraising. While this could be a by-product of underestimating processing costs
and the outcome of a maximization process trading off personal consumption utility and
altruistic utility for someone of low income, we conjecture this is more likely evidence of
symbolic, warm-glow giving.
Robustness Checks
In Appendix Table 1, we present a similar analysis as Table 2, but break down the
sample based on donors’ prior donation frequency. This, we conjecture, is essentially
reducing noise, as it removes people who are less likely to open the letter at all. We find a
general pattern of stronger results for those who have given in the past year.
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In Appendix Table 2 we present a similar analysis as Table 2, except use a probit
for the binary “any donation” outcome variable and a tobit specification for the “donation
amount” outcome variable because it is censored at zero. The results are qualitatively
similar, with no changes in statistical significance across the different specifications.
Interpretation and Discussion
Propositions 2 and 3 show that positive intensive responses to treatment identify altruists
and negative extensive responses to treatment identify warm-glow or similarly motivated
donors. In light of the model, our results provide evidence that large prior donors are
motivated by the benefits their donations produce, and small prior donors are motivated
by emotional benefits produced by the act of giving.
Naturally other explanations exist for the results from this experiment. First,
differences in treatment effects between small and large prior donors may stem from
demographic differences rather than different motivations. For example, large prior
donors may be wealthier, and perhaps wealthier donors are more educated, more able to
understand the importance of rigorous evaluations. Although the demographic data at the
zip-5 code level enable tests of whether heterogeneity in giving is driven by education or
income, rather than prior donation amount, this is clearly a noisy proxy for education at
the individual level.
Second, large prior donors may pay more attention to the marketing material. This
would predict that large donors give more, but however would not predict that small
donors respond negatively (instead, it would predict that no effect on small donors).
Third, ultimately the treatment and control mailers included different language to
convey the information, and the specific words chosen to convey scientific information
may have triggered other, unintended, emotional or analytical responses. This is the
natural challenge with mapping any direct marketing mailer to a specific theory. This
concern is similar to the first alternative explanation, in that it requires there to be some
unobserved difference in how big and small prior donors respond to the particular
wording. For instance, if small prior donors (but not large ones) interpreted the treatment
as signaling the problem is worse and thus their donation will not make a big indent in
the problem, they may respond negatively (and big donors not). This would be consistent
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with Fethersonhaugh (1997). However, our treatments briefly emphasized positive
outcomes as measured by “rigorous scientific methodologies” without specifying the
extent of the problem, thus we do not think this is a likely explanation.
5. Conclusion
We find that presenting positive information about charitable effectiveness
increases the likelihood of giving to a major U.S. charity for large prior donors, but
turned off small prior donors. This heterogeneity is important, and is consistent with a
model in which large donors (holding all else equal, including income and wealth) are
more driven by altruism and small donors more driven by warm glow motives. We posit
that altruistic donors are more driven by the actual impact of their donation, and thus
information to reinforce or enhance perceived impacts will drive higher donations. On the
other hand, for warm glow donors, information on impacts may actually deter giving by
distracting the letter recipient from the emotionally powerful messages that typically
trigger warm glow and instead put forward a more deliberative, analytical appeal which
simply does not work for such individuals. This distinction is much along the lines of
Kahneman (2003), in which System I decisions (peripheral decisions which use intuition
and mere reaction, but no deliberation) are “warm glow” decisions, and System II
decisions (deliberative decisions requiring conscious reasoning and thought) are
“altruism” decisions.
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Appendix I: Test from Direct Marketing Solicitations
Wave 1: June 2007
Research Mailer
The following text and a picture of an old woman identified as Sebastiana, surrounded by
a pink border:
She’s known nothing but abject poverty her entire life. Why on earth should
Sebastiana have hope now? After forty-two years of toil in the unforgiving land of
the high Andes, Sebastiana looks much older than her years. She has borne nine
children and is alone to care for them after losing her husband six years ago. But a
few months ago, Sebastiana joined a women’s group sponsored by Freedom from
Hunger. There she received a loan of $64 and training on how to grow her small,
home-based business.
But does she really have a right to hope for something different? According to
studies on our programs in Peru that used rigorous scientific methodologies,
women who have received both loans and business education saw their profits
grow, even when compared to women who just received loans for their
businesses. But the real difference comes when times are slow. The study showed
that women in Freedom from Hunger’s Credit with Education program kept their
profits strong – ensuring that their families would not suffer, but thrive.
Control Mailer
The following text and a picture of an old woman identified as Sebastiana, surrounded by
a pink border:
She’s known nothing but abject poverty her entire life. Why on earth should
Sebastiana have hope now? After forty-two years of toil in the unforgiving land of
the high Andes, Sebastiana looks much older than her years. She has borne nine
children and is alone to care for them after losing her husband six years ago. But a
few months ago, Sebastiana joined a women’s group sponsored by Freedom from
Hunger. There she received a loan of $64 and training on how to grow her small,
home-based business.
But does she really have a right to hope for something different? Like Sophia and
Carmen before her, the good news is, yes! Because of caring people like you,
Freedom from Hunger was able to offer Sebastiana a self-help path toward
achieving her dream of getting “a little land to farm” and pass down to her
children. As Sebastiana’s young son, Aurelio, runs up to hug her, she says, “I do
whatever I can for my children.”
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Wave 2 October 2008
Treatment Mailer
In order to know that our programs work for people like Rita, we look for more
than anecdotal evidence. That is why we have coordinated with independent
researchers [at Yale University] to conduct scientifically rigorous impact studies
of our programs. In Peru they found that women who were offered our Credit
with Education program had 16% higher profits in their businesses than those
who were not, and they increased profits in bad months by 27%! This is
particularly important because it means our program helped women generate
more stable incomes throughout the year.
These independent researchers used a randomized evaluation, the methodology
routinely used in medicine, to measure the impact of our programs on things like
business growth, children's health, investment in education, and women's
empowerment.
Control mailer
Many people would have met Rita and decided she was too poor to repay a loan.
Five hungry children and a small plot of mango trees don’t count as collateral.
But Freedom from Hunger knows that women like Rita are ready to end hunger in
their own families and in their communities.
Treatment postscript at bottom of letter
Rita is one of more than a million women Freedom from Hunger serves. We work
hard to deliver services that make a difference – and we employ rigorous
research[, like the evaluation by Yale University,] to keep us on track, to
maximize our impact on women and their children all over the world. Your prior
gifts have made these measurable impacts possible. Please continue to help us and
make a gift today!
Control postscript at bottom of letter
Rita is one of more than a million women Freedom from Hunger serves – women
who continue to prove the power of credit and education in the hands of a
determined mother. Your prior support has been an essential ingredient in this
worldwide recipe for financial security. Please continue to help us and make a gift
today!

16

Appendix II: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We show the first claim; the proof of the second claim is similar.
Note that the optimal donation !∗ is a critical point of !(!), so !∗ !!{0, !! , !! }, where gA
is the solution to !! !" = 1 and gW is the solution to!! ! = 1.
Next, !∗ is never at g=0. By assumption, perfectly warm-glow donors with ! = 0 prefer
gW and perfectly altruistic donors with ! =1 maximize utility at !∗ = !! > !! . For
interior !, ! ! !! > 1!so all donors prefer ! = !! to ! = 0.
From the Implicit Function theorem,
!!∗
!! !!∗ − !′(!∗ )
=− !
.
!"
!! ! !!∗ + 1 − ! !′′(!)
The denominator is negative and so if the numerator is positive g* is strictly increasing in
!. Because !! < !∗ < !! and A and W are strictly concave, !! !!∗ > 1 and
!! !∗ < 1, so the numerator is positive. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: Provided !∗ = 0 is not optimal, the implicit function theorem
yields
!!∗
!"

=−
!!!

!(! !!∗ + !∗ !" !"∗ )
.
! ! ! !!∗ !! ! ! !!∗ + 1 − ! !′′(!)

The numerator is strictly positive given −!!! (!)/! (!) ! < !1 and the comparative static
is continuous in !, so for high !, !!!∗ !/!!!!!is still positive. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: Subjects choose !∗ = 0 after treatment if ! ! 0 < 0. This
condition can be rewritten as
!!! < ! =

1 − !"#′(0)
1 − ! !′(0)

where ! is the maximum emotional attachment such that donors do not give. This cutoff
falls in beta, i.e., relatively more altruistic subjects require less emotional attachment to
give a positive amount:
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!!
=
!"

1
1 − ! !! 0

!

! ! 0 1 − !!! 0

− 2!"! ! 0 !′(0) < 0

Because donors before treatment give a positive amount by assumption, ! ! 0 > 0 and
!!! 0 > 1, so the second term is strictly negative. QED.
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Figure 1: Treatment Effect on Likelihood of Making Any Donation, by Quartile of Prior Gift

Quartile 1 of Prior Gift

Quartile 2 of Prior Gift

Quartile 3 of Prior Gift

Treatment Effect by Quartile

Quartile 4 of Prior Gift

Upper/Lower

Note: Results from regressions that included control for stratification variables and quartile of prior gift.
95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors.
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Figure 2: Treatment Effect on Amount Given, by Quartile of Prior Gift

Quartile 1 of Prior Gift Quartile 2 of Prior Gift Quartile 3 of Prior Gift Quartile 4 of Prior Gift

Treatment Effect by Quartile

Upper/Lower

Note: Results from regressions that included control for stratification variables and quartile of prior gift.
95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Means and Standard Deviations
Wave One

Treatment
Pre-experimental measures
Percent who have given before
Log of last donation amount
# of months since last donation
Proportion in both waves
Average years of education (census tract)
Median income (census tract, in thousands)

Experimental Results
# mailers sent
Gave any donation
Average donation amount

Wave Two

Control
Insert
No Insert

Treatment
No Yale
Yale

Control

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

3.13
(1.12)
15.6
(12.2)
0.769
(0.422)
14.0
(2.95)
52.0
(23.9)

3.15
(1.09)
15.7
(12.2)
0.774
(0.419)
14.1
(2.87)
52.4
(23.4)

3.13
(1.13)
15.6
(12.2)
0.777
(0.419)
14.0
(3.02)
51.6
(24.1)

3.21
(1.15)
17.2
(12.8)
0.733
(0.442)
14.0
(3.00)
52.4
(24.3)

3.20
(1.15)
17.6
(13.0)
0.733
(0.442)
14.0
(3.10)
52.4
(24.6)

3.21
(1.14)
17.4
(12.9)
0.732
(0.443)
14.0
(2.92)
52.1
(24.0)

5631

5630

5628

5903

5921

5960

0.159
(0.366)
10.11
(116.3)

0.158
(0.364)
9.41
(62.80)

0.163
(0.370)
11.63
(272.7)

0.182
(0.386)
22.54
(424.6)

0.191
(0.393)
15.67
(133.4)

0.193
(0.395)
15.09
(122.5)

Notes: Within wave, for all pre-experiment variables, there are no statistically signifcant differences at the 10% level across treatment
assignments.
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Table 2: Treatment Effects on Combined Rounds
OLS

Outcome:
Received insert emphasizing research

Any
donation
(1)

Amount
donated
(2)

Amount donated
(winsorized at
$1000)
(3)

Amount
donated
(ihs)
(4)

0.00035
(0.0062)

2.35
(1.98)

-0.074
(0.82)

-0.00086
(0.026)

0.14***
(0.0067)

5.85*
(3.35)

5.32***
(0.83)

34673
0.045
3.171
0.174

34673
0.0081
3.171
14.17

34673
0.083
3.171
11.30

0.53***
(0.028)

-0.056**
(0.027)
0.021***
(0.0063)
-0.029***
(0.0054)
-0.00016
(0.00022)
-0.00012
(0.0018)
0.17***
(0.030)

-20.8*
(11.2)
10.4**
(4.76)
3.85
(2.92)
-0.018
(0.23)
-0.55
(0.84)
-4.96
(8.09)

-9.65**
(4.80)
3.56**
(1.44)
5.87***
(1.18)
-0.0019
(0.042)
-0.097
(0.31)
-9.60**
(4.56)

-0.20**
(0.10)
0.079***
(0.024)
0.089***
(0.020)
-0.00096
(0.0010)
0.00013
(0.0076)
0.026
(0.12)

34673
0.057
3.171
0.710

34673
0.047
3.171
0.174

34673
0.010
3.171
14.17

34673
0.098
3.171
11.30

34673
0.064
3.171
0.710

Received research insert X ln(amount of last gift)
ln(Amount of last gift)
Received insert emphasizing research X education
Received insert emphasizing research X income
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R^2
Mean of ln(amount of last gift)
Mean of dependent variable

Any
donation
(5)

Amount
donated
(winsorized at Amount donated
Amount donated
$1000)
(ihs)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the stratification variables for the random assignment, control for presence of insert (wave 1), and the interaction of large
prior donor mailing package with treatment. Columns 5-8 include control for average education and income levels at the census precinct level. For round 1, the randomization was stratified based on prior
giving amount (above/below 100) and recency of donation. For round 2, the randomization was stratified based on prior giving amount (above/below 100), whether they donated in 2008, and treatment
status in prior rounds. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
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Appendix 1: Analysis Separated by Recent and Past donors
OLS
Recent donors (>0 gifts in the last year)

Outcome:
Received insert emphasizing research
Received research insert X ln(amount of last gift)
ln(Amount of last gift)
Received insert emphasizing research X education
Received insert emphasizing research X income
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R^2
Mean of ln(amount of last gift)
Mean of dependent variable

Any
donation

Amount
donated

Non-recent donors (0 gifts in the last year)

Amount donated
(winsorized at Amount donated
$1000)
(ihs)

Any
donation

Amount donated
(winsorized at Amount donated
Amount donated
$1000)
(ihs)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.075
(0.047)
0.023**
(0.010)
-0.052***
(0.0083)
-0.00049
(0.00037)
0.0015
(0.0032)
0.53***
(0.053)

-33.9*
(19.9)
16.6**
(6.91)
10.7***
(2.42)
0.010
(0.13)
-1.28
(1.39)
12.6
(13.7)

-15.4*
(8.67)
5.47**
(2.42)
9.49***
(1.93)
0.0051
(0.074)
-0.19
(0.61)
9.64
(8.48)

-0.30*
(0.18)
0.092**
(0.038)
0.12***
(0.031)
-0.0028*
(0.0017)
0.0091
(0.014)
1.17***
(0.21)

0.0093
(0.025)
0.0056
(0.0060)
0.0019
(0.0051)
0.000063
(0.00023)
-0.0018
(0.0016)
-0.0019
(0.028)

-9.35
(11.9)
4.50
(6.78)
-4.36
(5.85)
-0.059
(0.43)
0.29
(1.06)
-1.24
(8.62)

-5.33*
(3.12)
1.72*
(0.94)
1.35*
(0.76)
-0.028
(0.033)
0.15
(0.18)
-8.19***
(2.84)

-0.0039
(0.096)
0.033
(0.024)
0.058***
(0.021)
0.00029
(0.0010)
-0.0070
(0.0070)
-0.22*
(0.11)

16611
0.020
3.22
0.282

16611
0.068
3.22
21.452

16611
0.14
3.22
18.916

16611
0.056
3.22
1.146

18062
0.012
3.13
0.076

18062
0.00072
3.13
7.464

18062
0.038
3.13
4.290

18062
0.024
3.13
0.309

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the stratification variables for the random assignment, control for presence of insert (wave 1), and the interaction of large
prior donor mailing package with treatment. Columns 5-8 include control for average education and income levels at the census precinct level. For round 1, the randomization was stratified based on prior
giving amount (above/below 100) and recency of donation. For round 2, the randomization was stratified based on prior giving amount (above/below 100), whether they donated in 2008, and treatment status
in prior rounds. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
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Appendix 2: Treatment Effects on Combined Rounds
Probit and Tobit

Outcome:
Received insert emphasizing research

Amount donated
(winsorized at Amount donated
$1000)
(ihs)
(3)
(4)

Any
donation
(1)

Amount
donated
(2)

0.00065
(0.0066)

6.59
(13.7)

-0.055
(4.21)

0.0084
(0.16)

-717.9***
(195.5)

-192.5***
(8.00)

-6.44
(0.18)

34673
0.012
14.17

34673
0.023
11.30

34673
0.032
0.710

Received research insert X ln(amount of last gift)
ln(Amount of last gift)
Received insert emphasizing research X education
Received insert emphasizing research X income
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R^2
Mean of dependent variable

34673
0.054
0.174

Any
donation
(5)

Amount
donated
(6)

Amount
donated
(winsorized at
$1000)
(7)

-0.055**
(0.026)
0.021***
(0.0059)
-0.027***
(0.0050)
-0.00015
(0.00022)
-0.00013
(0.0017)

-136.4**
(59.5)
57.2***
(18.1)
-37.2**
(18.8)
-0.29
(0.64)
-1.34
(3.80)
-711.4***
(199.4)

-45.7**
(17.9)
16.3***
(4.64)
0.44
(3.73)
-0.059
(0.15)
-0.19
(1.17)
-213.2***
(20.4)

-1.22**
(0.59)
0.46***
(0.13)
-0.22**
(0.11)
-0.0040
(0.0052)
-0.0014
(0.041)
-7.20
(0.70)

34673
0.056
0.174

34673
0.013
14.17

34673
0.024
11.30

34673
0.032
0.710

Amount
donated
(ihs)
(8)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the stratification variables for the random assignment, control for presence of insert (wave 1), and the interaction of
large prior donor mailing package with treatment. Columns 5-8 include control for average education and income levels at the census precinct level. For round 1, the randomization was stratified
based on prior giving amount (above/below 100) and recency of donation. For round 2, the randomization was stratified based on prior giving amount (above/below 100), whether they donated in
2008, and treatment status in prior rounds. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
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Appendix 3: Disaggregated Treatment Effects for Combined Rounds
OLS

Outcome:
Received insert emphasizing research
Received research insert mentioning Yale
Received story insert
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R^2
Mean of ln(amount of last gift)
Mean of dependent variable

Any
donation
(1)

Amount
donated
(winsorized at Amount donated
Amount donated
$1000)
(ihs)
(2)
(3)
(4)

-0.0075
(0.0049)
0.0066
(0.0066)
-0.0069
(0.0063)
0.14***
(0.0046)

3.14
(3.51)
-4.71
(4.62)
0.100
(3.21)
7.09**
(2.80)

0.91
(0.72)
-0.68
(1.13)
0.89
(0.80)
4.63***
(0.58)

-0.018
(0.021)
0.0038
(0.029)
-0.017
(0.026)
0.54***
(0.019)

34673
0.045
3.171
0.175

34673
0.0081
3.171
14.166

34673
0.083
3.171
11.297

34673
0.056
3.171
0.710

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the stratification variables for the random assignment, control for presence
of insert (wave 1), and the interaction of large prior donor mailing package with treatment. Columns 5-8 include control for average education and income
levels at the census precinct level. For round 1, the randomization was stratified based on prior giving amount (above/below 100) and recency of donation.
For round 2, the randomization was stratified based on prior giving amount (above/below 100), whether they donated in 2008, and treatment status in prior
rounds. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
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